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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 
10042 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. This appeal presents the question as to whether 
or not in an action brought in this State to collect child 
support arrearages, a defense can relevantly and success-
fully be asserted other than payment; namely, that the 
mother deliberately violated restrictions upon her place of 
residence and first took the children to Europe, choosing 
to support them from her own independent resources, and 
later concealed their whereabouts from the father. 
6. The lower court held that no defense could be rele-
vant other than actual payment, and entered judgment for 
the net unpaid amount, including interest. 
BERTHA M. McCLURE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
EDWIN E. DOWELL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
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c. Appellant seeks to reverse this judgment and to 
have the case remanded for trial as to the equitable defense 
sought to be imposed; and in any event to set aside that 
portion of the judgment for interest. 
d. The material facts of the case are as follows: 
Both parties are now before the Utah court, although 
they were long since married and then divorced in other 
jurisdictions. Jurisdiction of the Utah court, both as to the 
parties and the issue involved, was stipulated (Tr. 7, 10, 
11), the case originally having been initiated under the 
Uniform Reciprocal Support Act (R. 1-8). It was further 
stipulated that the child support payments for the two-
year period September 1, 1961 until September 1, 1963 
under the decree of the sister state of Alabama had not 
been paid (Tr. 11-12) for reasons which hereafter follow. 
There is also no genuine issue as to the following facts: 
a. The parties were married in New York December 
12, 1950. Two children were born of this marriage, Kelly 
Culnan, September 28, 1951, and Edwin E., Jr., November 
11, 1956. 
b. Anticipating divorce, the parties under date of 
January 29, 1957 entered into a lengthy and carefully 
drawn property settlement agreement, which is Exhibit 
D-2 in the record. 
c. Thereafter both of the parties established resi-
dence in Alabama, and then under date of February 6, 
1957 the Circuit Court of Russell County, Alabama, made 
and entered a decree of divorce (Ex. D-l) . Custody of 
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he children was awarded to the Mother, and the Father 
pas ordered to pay for their support the sum of $150.00 
ach per month. 
d. The settlement agreement, but not the divorce 
lecree, specifically provided that the Father should have 
certain definite visitation rights as follows: 
«* * * during the entire month of July or 
August; during the entire period of the Easter, 
Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays in alternate 
years and on alternate week-ends for forty-eight 
hour periods throughout the year." 
Further, the Mother "will not, without the prior 
written consent of the husband, change the perma-
nent residence of said daughter and son nor remove 
either of them to a place distant more than two 
hundred fifty (250) miles from Westport, Connecti-
cut, (Buffalo, New York and Port Colbourne, On-
tario, Canada excepted) provided, however, that the 
wife shall be permitted without such consent to 
remove said daughter and/or son temporarily to 
a place distant more than two hundred fifty (250) 
miles from Westport for a total period not in excess 
of ten (10) weeks in any one year, and further 
provided that the wife shall be permitted to change 
the permanent residence of said daughter and son 
and to remove and keep them at a place distant 
more than two hundred fifty (250) miles from 
Westport if said change of residence is necessitated 
by either the wife's remarriage or by reason of her 
seeking and obtaining employment at such place. 
In no event shall the wife remove said daughter or 
son, either temporarily or permanently, to a place 
distant more than two hundred fifty (250) miles 
from Westport without giving to the husband notice 
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by registered mail at least twenty-five (25) days 
prior to the date of such removal, in which notice 
she shall state the date of departure from Westport, 
and the name of the place, including the street ad-
dress, to which the children will be removed. 
"If the husband is prevented from having visi-
tation or custody as provided in this agreement by 
reason of the temporary removal of the children, 
a substitution of dates shall be made between the 
husband and wife for those periods which the hus-
band was prevented from visiting or having cus-
tody of said children. If the permanent residence 
of the children is removed to a place distant more 
than two hundred fifty (250) miles from Westport, 
the parties shall, if the husband so requests, consult 
and agree upon a different schedule of visitation 
and custody dates for the husband. 
<< * • * 
"If the marriage between the parties shall be 
dissolved," as it was, "By order, judgment, or de-
cree of any court of competent jurisdiction, the pro-
visions made by this agreement for the support and 
maintenance of the wife and for the support, main-
tenance, and education of their said daughter and 
son shall be in full satisfaction, discharge," and so 
forth; "and said agreement shall be incorporated 
in and made a part of any such order, judgment, 
or decree. However, this agreement and the pro-
visions herein contained shall survive any such 
order, judgment, or decree, or any amendment, 
modification, or vacatur thereof and shall not be 
superseded thereby." (Par. VIII, subsection (b).) 
(Emphasis ours.) 
e. Thereafter the parties observed and performed the 
terms of the settlement agreement for some time, the 
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Father moving to Utah and remarrying and the Mother 
marrying one John F. McClure, whose name she now bears 
as plaintiff in this proceeding. This latter marriage like-
wise did not survive, and plaintiff became entitled to and 
still receives $650.00 gross per month from McClure in 
addition to the $300.00 per month payable by appellant 
(Tr. 17). 
/. In November, 1960, when the McClure marriage 
broke up, the Mother determined to leave the United States 
for Italy (Tr. 18). For the purpose of this case and under 
appellant's proffer, this departure was without appellant's 
consent, and specifically was accomplished in the absence 
of the written consent provided for by the terms of the 
settlement agreement set forth above (Tr. 18). 
g. Mrs. McClure requested defendant to send the 
support checks to her in Rome in care of American Ex-
press. Defendant did so until September of 1961. At this 
time, having been effectively deprived of all visitation 
rights, the Mother being beyond the jurisdiction of the 
courts of Utah, Alabama or New York, and being advised 
that the funds he was sending were not being used for the 
care and support of the children, appellant discontinued 
payments. The immediate discontinuance was caused when 
defendant sent an airplane ticket for the older child's trans-
portation from Madrid, Spain, to Salt Lake City. But the 
ticket was only used to New York; and then it is appel-
lant's proffer — rejected as irrelevant by the lower court, 
that the Mother and two children dropped out of sight; 
and that despite appellant's attempts to locate them, he 
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did not learn of their residence or whereabouts until a con-
tact from plaintiff's attorney in April, 1963 — shortly be-
fore this action was brought to collect the omitted pay-
ments (Tr. 19). 
As noted above, both parties appeared in person be-
fore the Utah court below, and stipulated that visitation 
rights would now again be recognized and that the child 
support payments would be resumed effective September 
1, 1963. Thus the sole remaining issue became the Mother's 
right to the omitted support money for the two-year period, 
during which on her own resources and contrary to the 
settlement agreement, she herself determined to live in 
Europe indefinitely and to deprive deliberately the Father 
of his visitation rights with his two children. 
The trial court held that in such a case actual payment 
would be the only available defense (Tr. 11). Accordingly 
judgment was entered in the sum of $7,046.76 ($7200.00 
less the cost of the used portion of the airplane ticket from 
Madrid, Spain, to New York) (R. 16, 17). Appellant was 
also assessed $420.00 for interest. 
This appeal is from that part of the judgment only 
which pertains to the net arrearages for the two years and 
the interest thereon. 
ARGUMENT 
At the outset it should be noted that we do not have 
the usual case where the welfare and actual present need 
for funds for support of the minor children are involved. 
In this case the Mother, with ample resources of her 
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3wn and on her own initiative, voluntarily took appellant's 
children along with the rest of her family to Europe for 
an indefinite stay. She continued to support them from 
ier own and other resources, and only when her whims 
iictated did she return to this country with her children. 
Even then it was at her own convenience and months later 
when she finally bothered in 1963 to call upon the Father 
md ask (1) for resumption of current payments, which 
was willingly done as soon as appellant's visitation rights 
were reestablished; and (2) for appellant to pick up the 
tab for her European venture from September, 1961 to 
September of 1963. The record is silent as to how much 
if anything the Mother paid during this two-year period to 
care for the children as she toured on her own through 
[taly, Spain and possibly other countries, until eventually 
she chose to return to New York and bothered to resume 
contact with appellant. 
Nor do we have the fact situation of Baker v. Baker, 
119 Utah 37, 224 P. 2d 192 (1950). There, with his child-
ren in need and himself in contempt for default in paying 
the attorneys' fees, costs and support money awarded by 
the Court, the Father failed in his attempt to assert as an 
excuse for evading his own social, moral and legal obliga-
tions, a technical breach by the Mother of the visitation 
provisions when she had moved the children to Oregon 
where were her other children, relatives and friends. 
Then, too, we do not here have the case where the 
j>7200.00 had been reduced to judgment in Alabama, so that 
all the Utah court would be doing would be to give "full 
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faith and credit" to the judgment of its sister State which 
had vested the accrued payments in the Mother as payee. 
It should also be noted that anticipatory settlement 
agreements such as here involved are valid in New York 
and elsewhere — indeed are "highly favored in the law". 
Hill V. Hill, 23 Cal. 2d 82, 142 P. 2d 417; Auten v. Auten, 
308 N. Y. 155, 124 N. E. 2d 99, 50 A. L. R. 2d 246. The 
agreements, although always subject to court scrutiny, are 
sustained even though not included in the divorce decree. 
Galusha V. Galusha, 116 N. Y. 635, 22 N. E. 1114, 6 L. R. S. 
487, 17 Am. Jur., Divorce & Separations, §§ 905-906; also 
§ 920. But of course they cannot be used to avoid or defeat 
continuing legal obligations and duties to provide under the 
relevant circumstances adequate alimony and support 
money. 17 Am. Jur. 894. 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF, HAVING VOLUNTARILY DE-
PRIVED THE FATHER OF HIS VISITATION 
RIGHTS, FORFEITED HER RIGHT TO REIM-
BURSEMENT FOR SUPPORT P A Y M E N T S 
DURING THE PERIOD INVOLVED. 
Utah clearly recognizes that a divorcee who voluntar-
ily deprives the father of visitation rights with his children 
may forfeit her right to reimbursement for support pay-
ments during the period involved, and that payment is not 
the only defense to her action. In Larsen VS. Larsen, 5 U. 
2d 244, 300 P. 2d 596, beginning at page 226 the Court 
said: 
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"It is stated on page 886 of 137 A. L. R.: 
'It would seem, from a perusal of the cases, 
that it is recognized by at least a majority of 
the courts that circumstances may be such as 
to enable a husband to avoid payment of per-
manent alimony or support and maintenancce 
of children allowed by decree or order of court, 
or at any rate payment of past-due instalments 
thereof, on the ground of laches or acquiescence 
on the part of the wife. However, as intimated, 
the question as to whether such defense is 
available in a particular case depends upon the 
circumstances present therein. * * *' 
"(1) A reading of the cases cited in support 
of the above quoted statement discloses that relief 
to the father of a minor from such support money 
judgment depends on the view of the court deter-
mining the case as to what is equitable under the 
circumstances. We conclude that the evidence is 
sufficient from which the trial court could reason-
ably find facts which would support a holding that 
the respondent is barred from recovering a part of 
this judgment for back support money on the 
grounds which the above quotation calls laches or 
acquiescence but which actually appear to rest on 
equitable estoppel.1 We are sending the case back 
to make findings on those issues for we conclude 
the evidence is sufficient to support findings either 
way. The court may make such findings from the 
evidence already received or the court in its discre-
tion may allow the parties to reopen the case and 
introduce additional evidence on such questions. 
"(2) In Price V. Price,2 we held that because 
the state is interested in the child's welfare the par-
2Price V. Price, 4 Utah 2d 153, 289 P. 2d 1044. 
lOpenshaw V. Opemhaw, 105 Utah 574, 579, 144 P. 2d 528. 
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ents cannot effectively release future payments of 
support money by agreeing with the other to that 
effect. However, this does not mean that a mother 
may not by her actions or representations, or both, 
preclude herself from recovering past due install-
ments of support money to reimburse her for the 
money which she has spent for the support of the 
child. Where the father's failure to make such pay-
ments was induced by her representations or ac-
tions and where as a result of such representations 
or actions the father has been lulled into failing to 
make such payments and into changing his position 
which he would not have done but for such repre-
sentations, and that as a result of such failure to 
pay and change in his conditions it will cause him 
great hardship and injustice if she is allowed to 
enforce the payment of such back installments, she 
may be thereby estopped from enforcing the pay-
ment of such back installments. So in this case if 
the trial court finds from the evidence that appel-
lant would not have left his job and gone on a mis-
sion for his church but for such representations 
that she would not require him to pay such install-
ments if he would just leave her and the child alone, 
and that appellant in reliance upon her representa-
tions complied with her request and that thereafter 
she supported the child and if such payments are 
collected from him she will be entitled to them for 
her own use and benefit, and that it would be a 
great hardship on him to now force him to make 
such payments, she would now be estopped from 
forcing him to pay such past due installments as 
accrued during the time he was filling such mission. 
"(3) / / the child has been the beneficiary of 
equivalent support and education so that the mother 
is entitled to receive all of said past due support 
money, she would be free to release, compromise or 
waive that which is hers. But if the child had been 
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provided bare shelter and food, and denied the bene-
fit of proper clothes and dental and medical care, 
then the mother should not be free to waive that 
portion of past due support money that the child 
has not received. The authorities cited above hold 
that this doctrine is applicable to this extent. It is 
the prerogative of the trial court to determine these 
facts and if he finds that facts exist to justify equit-
able estoppel, he should apply that doctrine and re-
lieve the father from payment of the installments 
to the extent indicated. Of course, as to future pay-
ments, there is no question but what she is entitled 
to collect from the time she made demand, and ap-
pellant does not dispute this. He has been making 
such payments since her demand for them." (Em-
phasis added.) 
The test laid down by this decision for relieving a 
ather of accrued child support is "what is equitable under 
le circumstances". The test is certainly not the hard and 
ast legal rule of the court below that payment is the only 
efense. 
The case now before the court has nothing to do with 
uture payments of support and thus does not run afoul 
f the Price case. The father is paying and since Septem-
er, 1963 has been paying $300.00 per month for the sup-
ort of his two minor children. The mother has also re-
Bntly agreed to allow the father to visit with the children. 
In our case it is only equitable that the accrued child 
upport payments be forfeited because the husband did not 
now where the children were during the period in ques-
:on; he attempted to locate them; the wife was financially 
ble to live in Europe and to furnish the children "equiva-
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lent" support; and she deliberately deprived the husband 
of his visitation rights during the two-year period. Fur-
thermore, the action of the wife in removing the children 
from the United States to Italy without the husband's con-
sent or court approval was in complete disregard of the 
terms of the settlement agreement. By representing that 
one child would fly to Salt Lake City, Utah from Madrid, 
Spain, when in fact she caused the child to fly only to New 
York; in then causing the children to drop out of sight for 
nearly two years; and by use of the money for things other 
than the children, she induced the father, indeed precluded 
the father, from making child support payments during the 
period involved. His failure to pay payments totaling $7,-
046.76, needless to say will cause him great hardship and 
injustice if the wife is now allowed to enforce the payment 
of the back installments for the time during which she de-
liberately denied him the visitation rights to which he was 
entitled. Now is there the slightest assurance that these 
funds would be expended for the children, or could benefit 
them by reimbursement of the Mother for any past care, 
or otherwise. 
Utah is not the only jurisdiction which precludes di-
vorcees from recovering back support for such action. The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court settled the problem for that 
state in Weinbaum V. Weinbaum, 153 A. 303, (1931). In 
that case the husband had a duty of support. This was 
conditioned upon the husband having reasonable child visi-
tation rights one day each week. The wife remarried and 
moved from Rhode Island to Florida. The husband then 
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;opped making child support payments. When the wife 
^turned to Rhode Island, she filed a petition asking that 
ie husband be held in contempt for failure to make the 
lild support payments. The court stated: 
"Under the facts appearing in the record, there 
is no merit in the claim that the respondent is in 
default in his payments while the petitioner was 
residing in Florida. The obligation of the respon-
dent to pay the weekly sum ordered for the support 
of the child is conditioned on his being allowed 
while a resident of Rhode Island to see her once a 
week at reasonable times and places. The petitioner 
in electing to take up her residence in Florida, tak-
ing the child with her, was no longer in a position 
to comply with the terms of the decree, and conse-
quently forfeited her rights thereunder so long as 
she remained in Florida and retained custody of 
the child." 
In the case of Anderson vs. Anderson, 291 N. W. 508 
1940), the Minnesota court was confronted with a situa-
on in which a divorced mother removed the child from 
linnesota to California without her former husband's con-
snt and without the consent of the court. The whereabouts 
f the child was kept from the husband. Later the mother 
3Ught to recover for accrued child support and the trial 
ourt denied relief. The wife appealed. The appellate court 
tated: 
"The trial court was correct in its action and 
must be affirmed. The decision of this court in the 
present matter was so clearly forecast by Eberhart 
V. Eberhart, 153 Minn. 66, 189 N. W. 592, especially 
after the explanation in Fjeld V. Fjeld, 201 Minn. 
512,2 77 N. W. 203, that little basis even for specu-
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lation remained. In the Eberhart case we said, 153 
Minn, at page 68, 189 N. W. at page 592: The 
plaintiff has taken the child from the jurisdiction 
of the court. So long as she keeps him without the 
jurisdiction, the defendant should be relieved from 
the payment of support money to accrue in the fu-
ture and that already accrued should not be en-
forced against him. 
"Plaintiff contends that a collateral attack is 
being made by defendant on the decree and that 
therefore it cannot succeed. We cannot agree. De-
fendant does not contest the validity of the decree 
or the propriety of the order directing the payment 
of $25 per month. Defendant's contention in its 
essence is that the decree, though valid, cannot be 
the foundation for an order compelling him to pay 
plaintiff since she has placed herself in such a posi-
tion by her conduct that she cannot now ask the 
court to invoke its processes for her benefit. A 
court should hesitate to grant relief to one who has 
intentionally violated a material provision of the 
decree which is sought to be enforced against an-
other. Judicial power is vested in courts to aid 
those who merit relief. Conduct such as plaintiff 
has been guilty of certainly does not commend it-
self. There was no error or mistake on her part but 
rather a deliberate and intentional act. While there 
is no doubt that plaintiff could be punished for con-
tempt if jurisdiction could be acquired we do not 
think that this is the exclusive process. Nor need 
defendant procure a modification of the decree. The 
defense, under the facts, was well taken. There may 
be instances where a party seeking to enforce a de-
cree has been at fault in a minor respect but still 
has equities that overbalance those of the party 
seeking to avoid the natural obligation recognized in 
the decree. In every case the primary duty and re-
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sponsibility rests upon the trial court in whom is 
vested a proper sphere of discretion to decide each 
case upon the facts as they appear. 
"We do not think that plaintiff's return to the 
state with the child made the decree, under the 
facts, enforceable as to the accrued, unpaid instal-
ments." 
The most recent Minnesota case holding that a wife 
>rfeits her claim to accrued child support when by remov-
Lg the child from the state she denies the husband child 
sitation is State of Illinois, ex rel. Shannon VS. Sterling, 
) N. W. 2d 13 (1956). The case was instituted, like the 
le before this court, under the Uniform Reciprocal En-
>rcement of Support Act. Illinois was the initiating state, 
he mother had removed three minor children from Illinois 
ithout the mother's consent and without court approval, 
he Minnesota trial court dismissed the matter on the 
round that the father had been deprived of his right to 
sit the children. The appellate court stated: 
"The Minnesota law as to the liability of the 
husband for the payment of unpaid installments of 
support money which have already accrued is set 
forth in Eberhart v. Eberhart, 153 Minn. 66, 68, 
189 N. W. 592, wherein we said: 
The plaintiff has taken the child from 
the jurisdiction of the court. So long as she 
keeps him without the jurisdiction, the defen-
dant should be relieved from the payment of 
support money to accrue in the future and that 
already accrued should not be enforced against 
him/ (Italics supplied.) 
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"Under the above rule it is clear that, where 
the wife, who by decree of divorce has been awarded 
the custody of minor children subject to the hus-
band's right of reasonable visitation, deprives the 
husband of his right of visitation by removing the 
children from the state without the court's approval 
or without the husband's consent, the husband is 
relieved from the payments of all unpaid install-
ments of support money which have theretofore 
accrued during the period he has been so denied his 
right of visitation." 
New York also recognizes that a divorced wife who 
removes the children to a foreign country over the former 
husband's objections, and thus effectively denies the hus-
band visitation rights, is not permitted to recover child 
support accrued during that period. Thus, it is clear that if 
Mrs. McClure, plaintiff-respondent in this action, had liti-
gated this matter in New York, her domicile and the state 
in which the marriage was celebrated, she would not have 
been able to recover for the accrued child support involved 
herein. The New York case is Goldner vs. Goldner, 309 N. 
Y. 675, 128 N. E. 2d 321 (1955), a New York Court of 
Appeals decision. There the wife sought to hold the hus-
band in contempt. The husband cross-moved to eliminate 
the support provisions. The trial court granted the wife's 
contempt motion and denied the husband's cross motion. 
The husband appealed, and the appellate division (135 N. 
Y. S. 2d 137) reversed the order, and held, as reported by 
the Court of Appeals of New York, as follows: 
«* * * (T)hat when separation judgment 
provided both for child support and visitation 
rights, but wife, over husband's objections, removed 
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children from the jurisdiction and to a foreign 
country for period of years, husband was entitled 
to temporary suspension payments until children 
were returned to jurisdiction when he might have 
right of visitation." 
POINT II. 
In any event, no interest was due. 
Had the wife not concealed the children and her 
hereabouts, the payments could have been tendered and 
3 interest would have accrued; but plaintiff made pay-
Lent impossible. Therefore, it would be unjust and in-
s table to assess interest in this case, at least until the 
[aintiff reappeared on the scene and made demand for 
ayment in April of 1963. 
PARSONS, BEHLE, EVANS 
& LATIMER, 
Calvin A. Behle, 
Milo S. Marsden, Jr., 
Attys. for Defendant-Appellant. 
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